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Good parents understand the perils of
overprotection. They know that letting
their children grow up often means let-
ting them take their lumps. The past two
decades have reinforced a similar princi-
ple with respect to the safety and sound-
ness of banks. Government protection
sometimes does as much to create the
problem as to solve it. Here is the eco-
nomics of moral hazard: Banks, secure
in the safety net offered by the govern-
ment, feel free to take increasingly risky
positions. Depositors, knowing their
deposits are safe, don’t care and will nei-
ther withdraw their funds nor demand a
higher interest rate. The deposit insur-
ance system then effectively insulates
the bank from market discipline. 
One proposed solution, or rather set of
solutions, to this problem aims at restor-
ing a measure of market discipline to the
banking sector—the regulatory equiv-
alent of cutting the apron strings. Several
recent proposals hope to restore disci-
pline by forcing banks to issue debt that
is not guaranteed by the government—
what they term subordinated debt.1 
This Economic Commentary examines
the reasoning behind such mandatory
subordinated-debt proposals and assesses
the evidence on their possible success.
n n   Incentives and Information
Subordinated-debt proposals would
require, indeed force, banks or bank
holding companies to issue some amount
(usually 2 percent to 5 percent of total
assets) of debt that is junior to deposits.
In case of failure, the bank would be
barred from making any payments on the
subordinated debt until all depositors
(and any other senior debt holders) were
paid off in full. Currently, many banks do
issue some amount of subordinated debt,
but there is no requirement to, and not all
banks (or even all large banks) do so.
The actual sub-debt proposals also spec-
ify further details, such as the debt’s
maturity, how much banks should issue,
and so forth, but it’s not worth examining
those details without a clearer idea of
how, in general, subordinated debt would
increase market discipline. It does so by
creating better incentives and providing
better information.
The key incentive problem that regula-
tors face in banking crises is the ten-
dency to “go for broke.” When a bank
gets into trouble, often its best strategy
for returning to health and profitability is
to take big bets that might pay off. If that
new shopping mall in the desert doesn’t
catch on, well, you were going to get
closed down anyway. If it does succeed,
you’re back in business. In a phrase, the
managers and owners (the stockholders)
get all the upside gain from the risky
loan, without bearing any downside risk.
They’re like a football team losing late
in the fourth quarter: Time to try a “Hail
Mary” pass that might win the game.
Ordinarily, such a pass would be too
risky, but now it gives the team a chance,
whereas three yards in a cloud of dust up
the middle certainly won’t win.
What’s wrong with a bank trying to re-
turn to profitability? The trouble is that
when it goes for broke and ends up deep-
er in the hole than before, the FDIC—
and ultimately other banks or the tax-
payer—must pick up the bill.2
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incentives. It has some maximum pay-
off—the promised principal and interest
payments. This means that it does not
share in the upside potential of equity. If
the bank generates high profits, it doesn’t
give debt holders any more money. If a
bank’s income is low, all of it is used to
pay depositors (or the FDIC). If income
is somewhat higher, the bank can pay the
holders of subordinated debt. Above
that, when sub-debt holders are paid in
full, stockholders get whatever remains.
Stockholders like increased risk, because
they get the upside gains but don’t share
in the downside losses. Depositors don’t
care, because they are insured. Subordi-
nated-debt holders do care, because they
don’t share in the increased profits if the
risky project succeeds, but they share in
the loss if it does not. Thus, like the
FDIC, which will be left holding the bag
if the bank cannot pay depositors, sub-
debt holders dislike risk.
How does this change the bank’s incen-
tives? Whereas before the bank could
raise money for that desert mall by
increasing deposits, it now must raise
some of the money by placing subordi-
nated debt. Potential investors, sensitive
to the risk, will demand a higher interest
rate, and the bank will find it harder to
grow. Subordinated debt thus reintro-
duces market discipline and punishes the
bank for taking on inappropriate risk.
Furthermore, subordinated-debt holders’
incentives are more closely aligned with
those of the FDIC, which also dislikes
increased risk at banks. 
Subordinated debt changes the political
incentives as well. Bank equity holders
have an incentive to keep a poorly per-
forming bank open as long as possible,
even if that means greater losses for the
FDIC; otherwise, they have no chance
of recouping their losses. Subordinated-
debt holders, however, want the bank
closed down so they don’t lose more. 
If the owners put political pressure on
regulators, in the form of PAC contribu-
tions and so forth, sub-debt holders 
have an incentive to apply counter-
vailing pressure.
The changed incentives lead directly to
subordinated debt’s other advantage—
increased information. Because sub-
debt holders put their money on the line,
they have an incentive to monitor and
observe the bank. It’s as if banking reg-
ulators (FDIC, Federal Reserve, Comp-
troller’s Office, the states) have enlisted
a group of “Baker Street Irregulars,”3
an auxiliary force of interested persons
who monitor changes in bank perfor-
mance between regular examinations.
The results of the “irregulars’” investi-
gations become public knowledge
through the price of subordinated debt.
When the bank’s behavior gets riskier,
investors demand a higher premium for
bearing that risk, and the interest rate on
that debt increases. (Of course, all inter-
est rates go up and down, so a better
measure is the spread between a bank’s
subordinated debt and a Treasury note
of similar maturity.)
Perhaps just as importantly, regulators
themselves may find the increased infor-
mation useful. Some proposals have sug-
gested that the spread on subordinated
debt be used to price deposit insurance or
to signal supervisors that a bank needs
closer attention. Some people even sug-
gest that the market will do a better job of
evaluating bank risk than will govern-
ment regulators. Investment banks, hedge
funds, and other large, sophisticated
investors may well know more about
how to value exotic options, interpret
complex hedge provisions, or judge the
viability of state-of-the-art systems for
risk management. So, aside from more
frequent monitoring, the “irregulars” may
well catch things the regulators won’t.
n n    Proposals and How 
They Differ
Advocates for mandatory subordinated
debt have not united behind any one spe-
cific plan. Proposals differ in the amount
of subordinated debt required, what size
banks would be subject to the require-
ment, how supervisors will use the infor-
mation, and details about the debt’s
maturity, how often it is issued, and who
may hold it. 
The proposals generally call for a sub-
ordinated debt requirement of between 
2 percent and 5 percent of total assets.
Proponents who would require the debt
in addition to banks’ current capital
favor the lower end of that range, while
those who would allow it to substitute
for current capital favor the higher end.
Adding a 2 percent subordinated-debt
requirement to the current capital re-
quirements, for example, would oblige
a well-capitalized bank to maintain a 
12 percent capital ratio instead of the
current 10 percent. The trick lies in set-
ting a requirement large enough to
make the discipline matter, yet not so
large as to burden the bank unduly.
While a larger number would probably
make banks safer, it might reduce their
lending and retard economic growth.
The proposals also differ regarding the
assets used to calculate the percentage.
Some want to use a fixed percentage of
a simple balance-sheet item like total
deposits, while others want to use risk-
weighted assets. 
Some proposals want to subject all banks
to the requirements. Others only want big
banks, with definitions of “big” that
range from more than $2 billion to more
than $10 billion in total assets. A major
concern is that the costs of issuing such
subordinated debt would be too heavy
for small banks, and so the requirement
would impair their health and profitabil-
ity directly. Moreover, it’s unlikely that a
secondary market for small banks’ debt
would develop, so that very little infor-
mation would be contained in the spreads
of any but the largest banks. A related
argument concerns whether the bank
itself or the bank holding company
should issue the debt. Holding-company
debt may be more liquid, but because the
holding company might own finance
companies, stock brokers, or a host of
other businesses, such debt may not pro-
vide information or incentives important
for the bank itself. 
How regulators would use subordinated-
debt requirements to enforce market dis-
cipline also varies. Many proposals
would rely on a higher cost of debt to
slow the growth of a bank that took a
course the market deemed too risky.
Others would tie the spread on sub debtmore directly to items under the supervi-
sor’s control, such as deposit insurance
premiums or restrictions on bank divi-
dends, deposit growth, or deposit rates.
Yet other proposals would place a rate
cap on the debt, so that if the market
demanded a 5 percent spread over Treas-
uries when the cap limit was 3 percent,
the bank could not issue the debt and so
could not grow. If the debt is of a short
maturity, this might even mean that the
bank would have to shrink its loans in
order to meet the sub-debt requirement. 
Questions of maturity, issue frequency,
and so on may have a technical quality
that only a bond trader or a policy wonk
could love, but such details will be crucial
in determining whether subordinated-
debt proposals would work as planned.
For example, consider the maturity of the
debt. If the maturity is too short, it might
be expensive for banks to continually
issue. Investors consequently would have
less incentive to monitor, knowing their
bond would be paid off before anything
bad could happen. Too long a maturity
would allow the bank to go years without
issuing the debt, thus dodging the mar-
ket’s judgment. Most proposals argue for
a maturity of between two and five years,
and some argue for overlapping debt,
where a fraction matures each year or
each month. 
Some proposals have other special fea-
tures, such as making the debt puttable,
that is, giving investors the right to sell
the debt back to the bank at a previously
specified price. If enough people did sell
their debt back, then the bank would fall
below the minimum level of outstanding
subordinated debt. This might be a sig-
nal for regulators to close the bank, per-
haps after giving it a 90-day grace period
to reduce its assets or issue more debt. 
n n    Will It Work?
It is still too early to assess and choose
between individual proposals. Though it
is undeniably important to choose, at
some point, between puttable five-year
debt issued yearly and nonputtable two-
year debt issued monthly, certain larger
issues must be addressed first. Primarily,
these are two: Does the spread on subor-
dinated debt contain useful information?
Will regulators follow through on the
required discipline? 
The answer to the first question is a
strong yes. Spreads vary across banks
and across time. In 1990, a recession
year, spreads on banks’ subordinated
debt ranged from 0.92 percent to 32.53
percent.4 Some banks were borrowing at
a rate near that of the U.S. government;
others faced rates almost as high as those
exacted by the local mobster. Consider-
ing that many investors have suffered
losses on subordinated debt when a bank
failed, those spreads should not be sur-
prising. Exactly how regulators would
use the information in spreads, however,
varies by proposal, and several details
need to be hammered out.5 Still, the
information is there to be used.
But to return to the question of how reg-
ulators use that information: Some possi-
bilities, like increased supervisory
scrutiny of banks with high (or growing)
spreads, are relatively straightforward.
Tougher issues arise when something
more drastic must be done. If the bank
cannot issue enough sub debt to meet the
2 percent minimum, will regulators con-
tinue to enforce that minimum require-
ment? If a bank that already is considered
too big to fail has an “unreasonably” high
spread, what actions will regulators take?
The history of regulatory forbearance
during the thrift crisis may engender
some pessimism on this score.6
To their credit, however, many proposals
address these hard questions explicitly,
providing three reasons for cautious
optimism. First, some proposals take
important actions out of regulators’
hands. Once investors sell their puttable
bonds back to the bank, a definite event
has occurred, and a clock starts ticking.
Presumably regulators could give the
bank extra time, or even waive the
requirement, though doing so might be
harder if the put triggers cross-default
clauses in other bonds. How does this
differ from regulators’ postponing the
action of closing down a bank or thrift
known to be insolvent? The puttable
debt drags the bank (and the regulators)
into the public eye and thus increases
accountability.
The second reason for optimism is that
subordinated debt may make such for-
bearance politically more difficult. Some
proposals argue for restricting sub-debt
holdings to institutions with less political
clout, such as foreign banks. But more
importantly, as mentioned before, the
sub-debt holders themselves will oppose
this forbearance, because they also have
downside risk; their opposition will set
up a countervailing political influence. 
Finally, to the extent that sub debt acts as
an early-warning device, banks may be
closed before the FDIC—and taxpay-
ers—lose large sums money. Otherwise,
facing large losses, the government could
be tempted to try the same “go for broke”
strategy that got the banks in trouble.
Early closure is then the solution. This is
important, since there is a chance that
sub-debt holders too would want the
bank to go for broke, if it were so far
under water that even they could not be
paid back. 
These last two considerations suggest
why many people prefer sub-debt pro-
posals to other methods of enforcing
market discipline, such as regulators’
commitment not to bail out uninsured
depositors. Uninsured deposits give regu-
lators less information because investors
who leave the bank can do so unnoticed,
in a “silent run,” by simply transferring
their balances to another bank, or even to
the stock market. Dumping a comparable
amount of subordinated debt would af-
fect the price and alert regulators. Like-
wise, subordinated debt may create a
“bright line” that makes it politically
harder to bail out investors. It is a more
blatant and obvious step from depositors
to investors than it is from one type of
depositor to another.
n n    Conclusion
Subordinated debt is only one way to
increase market discipline on banks.7  It
is not the only or necessarily the best
way, and serious issues about how to use
information and how to provide proper
incentives must be resolved before any
such proposals could be adopted. But it
provides one realistic, intriguing way to
adapt banking regulation to the demands
of the twenty-first century. n n    Footnotes
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